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I. INTRODUCTION
When Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.1 was decided ten years ago, it was
widely derided as one of the worst corporate law opinions since Smith v. Van Gorkom.2
In fact, Chief Justice Myron Steele of the Delaware Supreme Court remarked at a
conference not long after that the opinion would likely have the life span of a "fruit fly." 3
I subsequently offered up a modest, and perhaps lonely, defense of the Omnicare
decision published in the pages of this Journal.4 In that defense, I argued that when
sellers grant buyers deal certainty there should be no expectation that such an act
provides sellers any value, notwithstanding nominal payments buyers might make in
exchange for that incremental certainty. 5 In fact, deal certainty should be expected to lead
to low-ball offers. 6 I argued that Omnicare, for all its faults, was helpful because it placed
fiduciary limits on sellers in situations in which sellers are not able to credibly resist
buyer demands for additional transactional certainty.7 These fiduciary limits, by pre-
committing sellers to a process that ensures a minimal degree of competition, or at least
the threat of it, force buyers to reveal private information about their valuations of the
sellers.8 Buyers, for their part, need not be denied deal certainty by Omnicare's
controversial rule. They can still get the transactional certainty they wish, but they have
to pay for it.
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
1. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
2. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
3. "So while I don't suggest that you rip the Omnicare pages out of your notebook . . . I do suggest that
there's the possibility, one could argue, that the decision has the life expectancy of a fruit fly." See David
Marcus, Man of Steele, D&O ADVISOR, Sept. 2004, at 16 (quoting Justice Steele).
4. Brian JM Quinn, Bulletproof Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. CORP. L. 865 (2007).
5. Id. at 877-88.
6. Id. at 879.
7. Id. at 867.
8. Id. at 878-80.
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Like other modest defenses, my defense of Omnicare was hardly sufficient to
protect the opinion's integrity. Now, all these years later, although it is still in my
notebook, Omnicare is slightly the worse for wear. Practitioners have learned to live
with-or more correctly-work around the decision. Deal protections are perhaps as
formidable as they have ever been. While the Supreme Court has not had an opportunity
to directly revisit the issue, the Chancery Court has taken the opportunities that have been
regularly presented to it to peel back the ruling's effect and distinguish the facts before it
from Omnicare's holding. Following the opinion, the courts could have taken Omnicare
as a cue to move the needle on a long-standing debate about the proper limits on board
action, but they collectively decided against that course of action. In recent years, as
practitioners have introduced transactional innovations in response to Omnicare, the
courts have regularly blessed them.
Notwithstanding the fruit fly rhetoric, Omnicare may have a much longer life than
many of its critics predict. In part, that is because of a second, now less controversial,
aspect of the opinion. In Omnicare, the Delaware Supreme Court made it clear that it
would apply Unocal9 to the analysis of board decisions to adopt deal protection measures
in friendly transactions not involving a change of control. 10 Looking back now,
subjecting deal protection measures to intermediate scrutiny was undoubtedly correct,
but, at the time, there were many in practice who believed that Paramount v. Timell
provided a green light to dealmakers to negotiate almost any deal protections subject to
business judgment deference. The clarification of the proper standard of review for deal
protections in the context of a friendly merger is an important and enduring contribution
of Omnicare.
Of course, in the years since Omnicare, there have been a series of subtle doctrinal
changes that now call into serious question the efficacy of Unocal's intermediate
standard. The development of the Unocal doctrine in recent years has tended to reduce its
plasticity and scope. In part, it appears, having given itself the power to review deal
protections in negotiated transactions, the court has since backed away from an
aggressive application of that oversight. The result is that Unocal has been largely
supplanted by what one might understand as a preliminary inquiry into the competitive
posture of a transaction, and then a more constricted view of Unocal's reach. Where
transactions do not benefit from alternative bids, courts will be highly deferential to board
decisions to grant buyers defensive measures. This approach to deal protections generates
a troublesome incentive for dealmakers to innovate and deploy deal protection measures
that fall just short of Omnicare's bright line rule, but are still powerful enough to deter
second bids.
Just as the courts have declined the opportunity Omnicare afforded them, the courts
have also narrowed the reach of Unocal's intermediate standard. When the Delaware
Supreme Court first announced the intermediate standard, Unocal's proportionality prong
suggested a role for the courts in substantive review of deal protection measures. 12
However, the courts have, over the years, increasingly narrowed the scope of a court's
9. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
10. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 934 (Del. 2003).
11. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,1151-55 (Del. 1989).
12. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955-57 (reasoning that a defensive deal protection device had to "be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed").
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review under the guise of proportionality. By now, preclusivity and "range of
reasonableness" analyses are dead letters. Because of the narrowing of Unocal's
application, the courts have been largely left to focus only on Unocal's coercion standard.
Coercive deal protections that implicate statutory obligations of the board and
shareholders are, by now, the only measures likely to run afoul of Unocal.
In Part II of this Article, I review my previous defense of the majority opinion in
Omnicare. The essence of that defense is that a prohibition against completely
bulletproofing transactions against subsequent bids is beneficial for selling shareholders
and helps boards overcome structural biases in negotiation. Such a rule does not dissuade
potential bidders who have alternate ways of generating some degree of certainty.
Notwithstanding the direction of the court and dealmakers in recent years, I believe this
defense of Omnicare's controversial holding remains largely correct. In Part III, I raise
the challenge that go-shop provisions present the most common criticism of the
Omnicare decision-that dealmakers value transaction certainty. In particular, it is
difficult for a proponent of deal certainty to reconcile a stated desire for transaction
certainty with the proliferation of a deal structure that purports to generate a post-signing
auction. In Part IV, I observe that in the years since Omnicare, dealmakers have proven
themselves to be perfectly competent to structure transactions around the opinion's
fiduciary requirement. In many ways, these new deal protection measures are just as
effective as the protections struck down in Omnicare, but the courts have decided to let
them stand. In Part V, I review what I call the new deal protection jurisprudence. The
court's own inherent conservatism has resulted in increasingly narrow room to maneuver
within Unocal's once flexible standard and Omnicare's mandate. By now, only coercion
remains of Unocal's proportionality prong. In Part VI, I provide some thoughts about the
future of Omnicare and conclude.
II. LEARNING TO LOVE OMNICARE
In Omnicare,13 the Delaware Supreme Court made two contributions of real import.
First, Omnicare established conclusively that the Unocal intermediate standard was to be
applied in all circumstances in which a board adopts a measure to defend a corporate
policy. The application of the Unocal standard was not dependent on the presence of so-
called Revlon duties. 14 In reaching this conclusion, the court observed:
There are inherent conflicts between a board's interest in protecting a merger
transaction it has approved, the stockholders' statutory right to make the final
decision to either approve or not approve a merger, and the board's continuing
responsibility to effectively exercise its fiduciary duties at all times after the
merger agreement is executed. These competing considerations require a
threshold determination that board-approved defensive devices protecting a
merger transaction are within the limitations of its statutory authority and
consistent with the directors' fiduciary duties. Accordingly, in Paramount v.
Time, we held that the business judgment rule applied to the Time board's
original decision to merge with Warner. We further held, however, that
13. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
14. Id. at 930 (internal citations omitted).
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defensive devices adopted by the board to protect the original merger
transaction must withstand enhanced judicial scrutiny under
the Unocal standard of review, even when that merger transaction does not
result in a change of control. 15
Although this result should have been clear to any reader of the case law, before
Omnicare, there was a wide-spread feeling amongst practitioners that, following Time,16
when negotiated or friendly transactions did not involve a change in control, board
decisions about how much and in what manner to protect a transaction from a subsequent
bid should receive the benefit of the business judgment presumption when challenged.' 7
In Omnicare, the majority made it clear that the problem of cognitive biases in the board
decision-making process is not constrained to boards resisting unwanted hostile offers.
Indeed, even boards motivated to sell the corporation may face subtle conflicts when
deciding whether, how, and with whom to pursue a corporate transaction. Before
providing the decision to grant deal protections with the benefit of the business judgment
rule in the context of a friendly transaction, the court must make a preliminary inquiry
into the reasonableness of the board's decision-making process. 18 The decision to apply
the intermediate standard to transactions not involving a change of control on its face
appears to be an appropriate development of Unocal's flexible standard of review that
takes into account the drastic change in circumstance between the mid-1980s when the
standard was first developed and the turn of the last century when boards were more
likely to be willing sellers, perhaps sometimes for the wrong reasons.
Omnicare's second-and more controversial---contribution is the bright line rule
that requires sellers' boards to include effective fiduciary outs in all merger agreements. 19
This holding has been widely criticized. Then-Chief Justice Veasey's dissent distilled the
15. Id.at930-31.
16. Paramount, 571 A.2dat 1151-55.
17. Then-Vice Chancellor Strine noted that deal protections should rightly be subject to intermediate
scrutiny in his "duck" footnote:
Under a "duck" approach to the law, "deal protection" terms self-evidently designed to deter and
make more expensive alternative transactions would be considered defensive and reviewed under
the Unocal standard. The word "protect" bears a close relationship to the word "from." Provisions
of this obviously defensive nature (e.g., no-shops, no-talks, termination fees triggered by the
consummation of an alternative transaction, and stock options with the primary purpose of
destroying pooling treatment for other bidders) primarily "protect" the deal and the parties
theretofrom the possibility that a rival transaction will displace the deal. Such deal protection
provisions accomplish this purpose by making it more difficult and more expensive to consummate
a competing transaction and by providing compensation to the odd company out if such an
alternative deal nonetheless occurs. Of course, the mere fact that the court calls a "duck" a "duck"
does not mean that such defensive provisions will not be upheld so long as they are not draconian.
McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 506 n.62 (Del. Ch. 2000). See also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical
Confision: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 56 Bus. LAw. 919, 929 (2001)
(providing different hypotheticals to demonstrate when courts use the business judgment rule or the Unocal or
Revlon standards). See generally Mark Lebovitch & Peter B. Morrison, Calling a Duck a Duck: Detennining
the Validity of Deal Protection Provisions in Merger of Equals Transactions, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1
(2001) (reviewing the case law and concluding that Unocal was the appropriate standard of review for deal
protections in the context of friendly mergers and transactions not involving a change of control).
18. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935.
19. Id. at 939.
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essence of the criticisms that would later become common amongst practitioners:
A lock-up permits a target board and a bidder to "exchange certainties."
Certainty itself has value. The acquirer may pay a higher price for the target if
the acquirer is assured consummation of the transaction. The target company
also benefits from the certainty of completing a transaction with a bidder
because losing an acquirer creates the perception that a target is damaged
goods, thus reducing its value. 20
Since Omnicare it has been widely believed that fidelity to the majority opinion
would be value reducing. The fear was that in the absence of the exchange of certainties
there might be a serious disruption in the deal-making economy as initial bidders became
less willing to make the transaction specific investments required to generate initial
bids. 2 1 To the extent anyone bids without bulletproofing, critics argue that bidders would
offer lower prices. 22
In the pages of this Journal, I argued to the contrary.23 Granting bidders
transactional certainty in the context of a bilateral negotiation would more likely result in
sellers receiving a lower share of the surplus available in the transaction than they might
otherwise expect. Also, I argued that the lack of contractual certainty in the form of
bulletproof transactions would not likely present an obstacle to deal-makers who have
alternate methods of assuring they can recoup transaction specific costs. Specifically,
buyers who wish additional transactional certainty can pay for it through higher bid
prices.
Ten years on, the parade of horribles that was supposed to accompany Omnicare
never appeared. Deals continued. One might even argue that sellers did very well during
the past decade up until the financial crisis of 2008. At the same time, it is clear that deal-
makers and the courts have not cottoned to the idea of minimally protected transactions.
Rather, parties appear to have grudgingly reconciled themselves to Omnicare; a
reconciliation that has involved formal compliance with the rule as well as a high degree
of contractual certainty.
In my defense of the Omnicare majority, I observed that bargaining power and
leverage in the acquisition market make it reasonable to believe that in bilateral
bargaining situations sellers may be unable to credibly resist buyer demands to
20. Id at 942 (internal citations omitted).
21. I adopt the term "bulletproof' to refer to the array of deal protections measures, including lock-ups,
exclusivity devices, termination fees, etc., that render a transaction immune to topping bids.
22. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 945-46 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that bidders will offer sellers
lower prices when deals are not bulletproof). For the argument that bidders will offer sellers lower prices when
deals are not bulletproof, see Meredith M. Brown & William D. Regner, Delaware to Directors: Don 't Do
Done Deals, M & A LAW., Apr. 2003, at 1; Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An
Appraisal of Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 572 (2004); Michael J. Kennedy, The End of
Time? Delaware's Search for the Fiduciary GUT, M & A LAW., Oct. 2003, at 21; Clifford E. Neimeth & Cathy
L. Reese, Locked and Loaded: Delaware Supreme Court Takes Aim at Deal Certainty, M & A LAW., June 2003,
at 16; Justin W. Ovaretz, Comment, Is a Merger Agreement Ever Certain? The Impact of the Omnicare
Decision on Deal Protection Devices, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 805, 812 (2004); Brian C. Smith, Changing the Deal:
How Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare Threatens to Fundamentally Alter the Merger Industry, 73 Miss. L.J. 983,
984 (2004).
23. See generally Quinn, supra note 4.
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bulletproof transactions because of structural biases. 24 For example, in consolidating
industries, or in transactions involving private equity buyers, potential sellers outnumber
potential acquirers. 25 To the extent there is bargaining power, it lies with buyers who
have alternatives to the present transaction. Sellers, particularly where shareholders may
be managers with undiversified wealth, have few alternatives to a negotiated deal and
therefore less bargaining leverage. In such a situation, an initial bidder can demand, and
expect to receive, increased transactional certainty. On the other hand, seller resistance to
buyer demand for excessive deal protections in exchange for a transaction is simply not
credible because loss of the instant deal would mean a material decline in the seller's
undiversified wealth.
Of course, a seller may seek additional consideration in exchange for buyer demands
for contractual deal certainty, creating an exchange of certainties. However, in a bilateral
negotiation, sellers have no way of discerning a bidder's private valuation of the seller
and, consequently, no way of adequately assessing the value of incremental deal certainty
to the bidder. In a bilateral negotiation, the best a seller can expect is a 50-50 split of the
transaction surplus. Similarly, a negotiation over incremental consideration in exchange
for deal certainty should be indeterminate in terms of expectation. However, the
combined problems of a structural bias in favor of acquirers with respect to bargaining
power and an inability of the seller to extract private information from the buyer in a
bilateral negotiation suggest that it is more likely sellers will systematically underprice
deal protections, thus leading to a lower share of the joint value the transaction creates for
sellers. At the extreme, because bulletproofing limits potential competition, buyers who
are able to bulletproof have an incentive to submit lower initial bids than they might
otherwise were their bids vulnerable to post-contractual competition, and thus shift even
more of the transaction surplus in their favor.26
Professor Thomas Schelling observed that "if the buyer [or seller] can accept an
irrevocable commitment, in a way that is unambiguously visible to the seller [or buyer],
24. Id. at 884.
25. With respect to private equity buyers, this logic is slightly counter-intuitive. However, to the extent
private equity bidders view every corporation as a stream of cash flows and every potential transaction as a bit
of financial engineering, private equity buyers have an almost infinite number of potential targets. Professor
Subramanian interviewed a private equity executive who noted how this dynamic works out in practice: "I sit in
meetings sometimes with the younger guys and they get all worked up about a situation. 'Bid whatever it takes,'
they'll say. I tell them to calm down, because deals are like buses: if you miss this one, there's another one
coming around the corner." GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, NEGOTIAUCTIONS: NEW DEALMAKING STRATEGIES FOR A
COMPETITIVE MARKETPLACE 99 (2010).
26. Anyone who has ever had the experience of shopping in a market in an emerging market country
implicitly understands the dynamic at play here. There are prices and values for goods that are not known to
you, the outsider. In the absence of some mechanism to cause the market vendor to reveal their private value for
the trinket in question, there is no way the visitor can ever expect better than a 50-50 split of the transaction
surplus. Quinn, supra note 4, at 878 (citing Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. ECON. PERSPS.
3, 9 (Summer 1989)). More often than not, the visitor will have no credible way of determining the true value of
the trinket and will get fleeced. That is to say, the tourist will overpay, and the vendor will receive a large
portion of the transaction surplus in such situations, unless the tourist can find a way to cause the vendor to
reveal private information about the true value of the trinket. In any event, one can change the negotiating
dynamics by simply walking away. Before you get too far, the vendor will inevitably reveal some information
about their valuation and reduce the price involved.
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he can squeeze the range of indeterminacy down to the point most favorable to him."27
Irrevocable commitments by the seller to the buyer of the type "I will sell to you and no
one else" have the effect of squeezing the range of pricing indeterminacy down to points
more favorable to the buyer. Such is the expected effect of bulletproofing a transaction in
favor of an initial bidder.
In addition to shifting surplus in favor of an initial bidder, bulletproofing also
increases the likelihood of socially inefficient transactions. There is no particular reason
to believe ex ante that an initial bidder is the highest valuing potential buyer for a seller.
To the extent successful initial bidders are able to entrench their first mover position with
bulletproofing, this may lock out other higher valuing bidders and lock in lower valuing,
socially inefficient outcomes. 28 Given these circumstances, a rule against bulletproofing
transactions-thus leaving initial bids open to second bids-would likely be an
efficiency-enhancing rule.
In addition, some critics of Omnicare suggest that a rule against complete deal
certainty leaves sellers vulnerable to "losing an acquirer, creat[ing the perception that a
target is damaged goods, thus reducing its value." 29 It is said that bulletproofing a
transaction protects sellers from the threat of being perceived as damaged goods. This
fear is over-wrought. In fact, if true, it would lead to the unfortunate circumstance that
every seller would have to complete a transaction with the first bidder to happen along
lest the market believe it is damaged goods for not completing a negotiation over a
proposed transaction. That fear is misplaced. To the extent a perception that the seller is
damaged goods is a problem, bulletproofing a transaction is not the solution.
Bulletproofing commits the seller to the buyer, not the buyer to the seller. Once a
transaction is in place, sellers are only likely to abandon it to pursue a superior proposal.
Contrary to being damaged goods, a seller who terminates a transaction in such
circumstances is generally going to create more, not less, value for its shareholders.
Precommitment to a particular buyer using bulletproofing is thus not justified by a fear of
being perceived of as damaged goods.
On the other hand, precommitment devices-like Omnicare's bright line rule-help
parties in a bilateral negotiation set credible negotiating limits in ways that they might be
unable to do themselves. 30 Rather than commit to deal exclusively with a particular
buyer, Omnicare's mandate creates credible, process-oriented limits that can be value
27. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 24 (1960). Note that Professor Schelling's
comments about precommitment relate to a commitment to process and not to a counterparty. The process
commitment states that the seller is willing to end up in the hands of whoever follows a predetermined process.
The individual commitment states that the seller is willing to end up in the hands of a particular buyer without
regard to other potential outcomes. The former statement leads to an efficient outcome with surplus shifted to
the seller. The latter makes no such efficiency guarantee and ensures that transaction surplus will remain with
the buyer.
28. Of course, some have argued that if a seller ends up in the hands of a low-value initial bidder, second
bidders can still purchase the asset from the initial bidder in a subsequent transaction. See, e.g., Stephen Fraidin
& Jon Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lock-ups, 103 YALE L. J. 1739, 1802-04 (1993) (arguing in favor of this
flipping hypothesis). This assumes that transaction costs associated with the market for corporate control are
low and serial transactions are common. See id. at 1792-93, 1803 (discussing transaction costs, their effect on
resales, and arguing that "transaction[] costs are irrelevant"). This is not likely.
29. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 942 (Del. 2003) (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
30. See Quinn, supra note 4, at 884 (discussing the benefits of a bright line rule against bulletproofing).
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enhancing. Process or rules-based precommitment strategies can be important devices for
signaling private valuations, moving parties off their bargaining positions and revealing
otherwise private information about their valuations of the seller. In revealing private
information, credible commitment devices can help ensure both that transaction surplus
shifts in favor of sellers (or at least not too far away from sellers) and that the seller ends
up in the hands of a buyer with the highest social value.
Of course, if bidders are unable to secure contractual certainty, it does not mean that
buyers must accept a world where sellers' transaction commitments are reed-thin, and
buyers forever face the prospect of losing transaction-specific investments to free-riding
second bidders. Rather, to the extent certainty is required to back up transaction-specific
investments, it must come from a different source. First, properly priced termination fees
should be sufficient to recoup a buyer's transaction-specific investments. If buyers seek
transactional certainty for reasons not related to their specific investments, then buyers
should reasonably be expected to pay for that additional certainty. Competition-even if
only implicit-for the sellers will result in higher prices for sellers because buyers
understand that only by revealing private information about their valuation through
preemptive bids can they ensure second bidders stay out. Where the initial bidder has the
highest private value for the seller and that value is reflected in a preemptive bid,
alternate, lower-valuing bidders will not have an incentive to top the initial bid. Put
differently, in the absence of a bulletproof transaction, a rational bidder will exchange
transaction surplus for certainty by bidding the price up even in the absence of present
competition for the seller.
Bulletproofing may sometimes be defended as innocuous when the buyer is the
"only game in town."3 1 However, there is reason to believe that bulletproofing a
transaction is never as innocuous as one might think. For example, if the probability of a
subsequent bid were zero (i.e. the buyer were truly the "only game in town"), then
rational buyers would never be willing to offer any increase in price in exchange for
bulletproofing. Rather, it is precisely because buyers understand that bulletproofing
excludes potential competition and allows buyers to take the seller for less than their
private valuations, thus retaining more surplus, that buyers are willing to offer some
nominal value in exchange for bulletproofing. Because bulletproofing does not increase a
seller's expected share of transaction surplus by more than a nominal amount, it is
difficult to argue that bulletproofing generates more value for selling shareholders than
the implicit competition one gets from Omnicare's fiduciary requirement.
III. THE Go-SHOP PUZZLE
With all the criticisms of the Omnicare decision and arguments in favor of deal
certainty, there remains a significant puzzle: the go-shop provision. Go-shop provisions
are by now ubiquitous in private equity transactions. To cite one example, when Dell
recently announced that it would be going private in a sale to Michael Dell and Silver
Lake Partners, the fact that the negotiated deal included a go-shop provision figured
prominently in the deal's description to shareholders. 3 2 When the terms of the transaction
31. Id. at 943.
32. Dell Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 5, 2013).
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were announced, the board's special committee, following months of negotiations with
the buyers, had reached agreement on a price of $13.65 per share.33 Following the end of
the 45-day go-shop period required under the terms of the merger agreement, the special
committee was able to identify two additional proposals at potentially higher
valuations.34
The current ubiquity of the go-shop provision is a puzzle given the widespread
articulation of the importance of an "exchange of certainties" to the process of deal-
making. In fact, rapid assimilation of go-shop provisions by market players turns many of
the objections to Omnicare on their head. In particular, a reasonable observer must be
struck by the fact that private equity buyers, who are famously opposed to playing
stalking horse in post-signing auctions, now readily agree to go-shop provisions and
happily place themselves in harm's way of falling victim to a winner's curse. 35
The development of go-shop provisions raises a question. Why is it that buyers who
are otherwise interested in deal certainty-indeed some of the very buyers who criticized
Omnicare when it was first handed down for threatening the deal economy-now
regularly agree to provisions to permit sellers to actively shop the initial transaction and
attempt to generate an active auction? Legal rules cannot explain the ubiquity of these
provisions in private equity transactions. The "no single blueprint" language of Barkan
resonates in this context. 36 No case or statute requires a board to rely on such provisions
to fulfill its fiduciary obligations to shareholders. 3 7 Unlike Omnicare where the court
opted for a bright line rule indicating the far limits of board action, the courts have
specifically noted that there are no positive requirements or bright line rules that a board
must comply with in order to meet its fiduciary obligations in a sale of control. 38
However, in the absence of such requirements, certain categories of buyers who are
otherwise averse to auctions have nevertheless opted to adopt transaction structures,
which, on their face, suggest increased buy-side uncertainty.
If it were true that transactional certainty were valuable to buyers, then one would
expect buyers to resist seller demands to include go-shop provisions in merger
agreements, especially because there is no legal requirement that a seller rely on the
device. Perhaps it may have been true at one point that buyers resisted seller demands to
engage in a go-shop process, but, by now, go-shop provisions have become
commonplace, and such resistance has faded into obscurity. Thus, we are left with the
question why buyers who otherwise crave certainty are willing to leave a carefully
negotiated transaction to the winds of fate.
Buyers should agree to go-shop provisions only if one of two things are true. First,
33. Id.
34. Dell Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 9 (March 25, 2013).
35. One can best categorize private equity and other financial buyers as common value buyers. In a
common value sale, the object for sale has a single, unknown value. Bidders estimate the true value of the
object. If bidders' estimates are normally distributed around the true value, the winning bidder is the bidder who
overestimates the seller's value the most. This is a version of the well-known winner's curse. See Richard H.
Thaler, Anomalies: The Winner's Curse, 2 J. ECoN. PERSPS. 191, 192 (Winter 1988) (describing the winner's
curse concept).
36. Barkan v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
37. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) ("[T]here are no legally prescribed steps
that directors must follow to satisfy their Revlon duties.").
38. Id.
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the price that buyers offer through the bilateral negotiating process before granting the
go-shop provision is sufficiently robust that buyers are confident that the price they offer
sellers will be materially larger than any reasonably likely subsequent bid. In effect,
knowing that a transaction will include a go-shop, wherein the seller will treat the initial
bidder as a stalking horse to generate an active post-signing auction, may incent initial
bidders to offer a preemptive bid to deter subsequent bids. In that view, the prospect of
competition, even if no competition subsequently emerges, should be sufficient incentive
for a bidder to shift transaction surplus to the seller. This should be true because every
incremental dollar in transaction surplus a seller receives in a preemptive bid reduces the
likelihood of a subsequent topping bid as the initial bidder takes out potential second
bidders with lower private valuations of the seller.39 The effect of precommitting to a
post-signing auction process is to cause the initial bidder to generate a preemptive bid to
effectively shut out post-signing competition. In this optimistic view of the go-shop
provision, the fact that a transaction is not bulletproof should result in higher prices for
sellers without preventing the buyer with the highest social value from acquiring the
seller.
A more pessimistic interpretation of the widespread adoption of go-shop provisions
is that go-shop provisions are not truly effective at generating post-signing competition
and that buyers understand as much. Because buyers understand that the variety of
embedded defenses-such as termination fees, matching rights, board recommendations,
and many others-as well as the common value nature of any bidding contest, give the
initial bidder the upper hand in any such contest, buyers are less resistant to go-shop
provisions. In this interpretation, although the go-shop makes it possible that a second
bidder might appear, it is not reasonably likely that one actually will. Defenses already
embedded in the merger agreement, as well as the common value nature of prospective
second-bidders, provide the acquirer with sufficient assurance that the transaction will
close without regard to the go-shop. To the extent the competitive effects of go-shop
provisions are no more than illusory, buyers should be willing to give sellers the go-shop
provision without threatening perceived transactional certainty. With an ineffective
competitive process in place, there is also little incentive for a buyer to reveal its private
information to the seller.
In his empirical study of go-shop transactions, Professor Subramanian tested
shareholder returns in transactions with go-shop provisions.40 Professor Subramanian
posited:
If go-shop clauses are an effective tool for identifying the highest-value buyer
and extracting full value from it, then returns to target shareholders should be
higher (or at least not lower) in go-shop deals than in the traditional no-shop
route. If instead go-shop deals deter potentially higher-value bidders, then
target shareholder returns should be lower in the go-shop sample than in the no-
shop sample. 4 1
Professor Subramanian found that in transactions with "pure go-shops," or go-shop
39. Quinn, supra note 4, at 879.
40. See generally Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and
Implications, 63 BuS. LAW. 729 (2008) (studying the effect of go-shop provisions on negotiations).
41. Id. at 751.
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provisions in transactions where there was no pre-signing market check, shareholder
returns were significantly larger than in similar transactions without go-shop
provisions.4 2 Contrast that with transactions with "add-on go-shops," or transactions with
a pre-signing market check as well as a post-signing go-shop, for which shareholders
returns are indistinguishable from similar transactions without go-shops. 43 Although
Professor Subramanian does not provide cumulative shareholder return data for
management buyouts ("MBOs") with go-shops, he does observe that in none of the
MBOs with go-shops was there a subsequent topping bid, whereas 17% of transactions
with pure go-shops and only 5% of transactions with add-on go-shops had competing
bids.44
Professor Subramanian's results suggest that the proper interpretation of go-shop
provisions is that where parties use them in lieu of a market check, bidders-faced with
uncertainty-attempt to buy certainty through the use of preemptive bidding. Buyers who
still value certainty will only agree to go-shop provisions if they are reasonably confident
that, notwithstanding the contractual uncertainty brought on by the go-shop provision, the
seller will have the economic certainty of closing the transaction.
This conclusion is consistent with the approach to understanding Omnicare that I
offered some years ago in the pages of this Journal.45 Rather than inhibit transactions,
when parties are required to structure their transactions in a manner that leaves them open
to viable second bids, initial bidders have an economic incentive to shift transaction
surplus in favor of the sellers through preemptive bidding, thus raising prices for sellers
and ensuring that sellers will end up in the hands of owners generating the highest
possible social welfare.
IV. LIVING WITH-OR WORKING AROUND-OMNICARE
In the years since Omnicare, few if any of the parade of horribles that accompanied
criticisms of the ruling have come to pass. In fact, practitioners appear to have learned to
live with and work around Omnicare's charge not to contract for complete transaction
certainty. Transactional innovations deployed since Omnicare pay lip service to the
ruling by technically complying with a narrow interpretation while still ensuring the
maximum amount of certainty for buyers possible.
While reliance on voting commitments to secure a majority of votes as in Omnicare
may be troublesome, the use of "fall away" voting commitments is a post-Omnicare
transactional innovation that has become relatively common. 46 Where the shareholder
base is reasonably concentrated amongst directors or a control group, as is often the case
in private companies, fall away commitments are a go-to strategy for locking up the vote
required to protect a transaction. Fall away commitments permit acquirers to secure
voting agreements sufficient to approve the merger agreement while still technically
complying with Omnicare. Some portion, but not all, of the votes committed under the
42. Id. at 730-31.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 731, 747.
45. See generally Quinn, supra note 4.
46. For example, the sellers in Synthes agreed to fall away commitments of the type described here. In re
Synthes, Inc. S'holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1030 (Del. Ch. 2012).
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voting agreements are subject to a contingency that permits the obligation to vote in favor
of the acquirer's transaction to "fall away" in the event a superior offer is presented to the
board following signing, but before the shareholder vote is held.
The size of the vote subject to these contingencies is usually sufficient to bring the
total vote irrevocably committed to the preferred transaction down to something less than
50%.47 With the majority commitments in place, the voting agreements provide the
buyers with adequate assurance that a controlling block will vote in favor of the initial
transaction without presenting shareholders afait accompli. In the event a subsequent bid
appears, the percentage permitted to fall away is just small enough to make it
mathematically possible for a superior bid to succeed.
The board designs these fall away commitments to comply with the formal
requirements of Omnicare while still providing the acquirer with a maximum of
protection from a potential subsequent bid. Typically, managers or other shareholders
who may be emotionally vested in the initial bid are otherwise predisposed to pursue the
initial bid notwithstanding second bids own contingent shares. Consequently, there is
every reason to believe that although a successful topping bid may be theoretically
possible, it is not realistically attainable. In that sense, these fall away provisions formally
comply with Omnicare's rule while not giving much by way of real protection for the
initial bidder.
Another post-Omnicare innovation is the quick delivery of written consents. 4 8
Where controlling or majority shareholders are easily accessible to the seller's board,
sellers can eschew a shareholder meeting and substitute an action by written consent
pursuant to Section 228 of the Delaware General Corporate Law (DGCL).4 9 Unlike
statutory voting requirements, there is no required notice prior to undertaking a
shareholder consent.50 Therefore, it is possible to sign a merger agreement and then,
nearly simultaneously, to receive shareholder approval via written consent for the merger
agreement. The board intends immediate or near immediate delivery of shareholder
consent to head off any potential second bid before it has a chance to appear. Indeed, the
shareholders deliver their consents even before the transaction is announced to the public.
As a consequence, the quick consent strategy formally complies with the requirements of
Omnicare without giving up much in the way of transactional certainty.
The quick consent strategy is coercive of selling shareholders and intended to be so.
Buyers will typically negotiate the right to terminate without paying a fee in the event the
board does not deliver consents sufficient to approve the merger agreement with the
acquirer within a designated window, typically 24 hours. 51 In such a situation,
47. For example, a controlling group might collectively hold 55% of the votes required to approve the
transaction. The commitment of those shares alone would be sufficient to assure approval of the transaction and
remove any doubt that the transaction would be approved. These voting commitments are subject to a
contingency. In the event the seller receives a superior offer, the acquirer agrees to free 5.1% of the control
group's stock from an obligation to vote in favor of the transaction.
48. In re OPENLANE S'holder Litig., C.A. No 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30,
2011).
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2010).
50. Transcript of Oral Argument at 127, Optima Int'l of Miami, Inc. v. WCI Steel, Inc., Civil Action No.
3833-VCL (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/files/
0702120713001.pdf (noting that the statute does not require votes to be held open for any particular period).
51. For defenders of deal certainty who argue that certainty may be necessary to prevent sellers from
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shareholders will be under extreme pressure to consent quickly to the merger agreement
or risk losing the transaction altogether. The board will present minority shareholders
who are likely not at the negotiating table with a fait accompli after the acquirer secures
written consents sufficient to approve the merger agreement.
Notwithstanding the Chancery Court's opinion in OPENLANE, 52 the quick consent
strategy should be preclusive. Although it is possible that a subsequent bid might appear
during the interim period between delivery of consents and closing, unless the seller's
board has negotiated a right to terminate the merger following shareholder approval and
before closing, the transaction may be practically immune to a topping bid. 53 The quick
consent strategy is preclusive of second bids by design. Transaction planners rely on the
fact that post-consent boards have no further statutory obligations, and therefore, the law
might not require them to consider a topping bid that appears during the lengthy interim
period between signing and closing. Of course, securing a vote in favor of the transaction
does not terminate any of the board's fiduciary obligations to the corporation or its
shareholders between signing and closing. Those duties are unremitting.
Elsewhere, I have tried to document the development of matching rights in recent
years. 54 Matching rights span a range from explicit requirements to engage in good faith
negotiations with the initial bidder upon the receipt of a superior proposal to broad
information rights for the initial bidder. Matching rights that require good faith
negotiation are quite specific about their purpose-to ensure that in any bidding contest
the initial bidder has the last opportunity to offer up a bid. To the extent any transaction
or bidders demonstrate common value attributes, having the last look can be an extremely
powerful deterrent to second bids. Indeed, mere information rights or built-in delays can
also be protective. In general, a broad conception of matching rights uses these delays to
explicitly or otherwise create opportunities for the initial bidder to match a superior offer
before the seller's board can terminate.
Although there are economic arguments to suggest that in some circumstances rights
of first refusal can powerfully deter second bids, courts have nevertheless regularly
dismissed matching rights as "modest deal protection measures." 55 Of course, the
suffering the perception of being damaged goods, the coercive aspect of the quick-consent strategy is a little
more than ironic. The acquirer can use the termination right that accompanies the quick-consent strategy as a
threat to turn the seller into damaged goods if the seller's shareholders waiver within the first hours of signing
an agreement.
52. In re OPENLANE, 2011 WL 4599662, at *9.
53. Section 251(d) permits boards to include provisions in merger agreements reserving unto boards the
right to terminate the merger agreement at any point prior to the filing of the Certificate of Merger with the
Secretary of State. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(d) (2010). There is, of course, a strong argument that even
without such a provision, boards under certain circumstances may be required to terminate an existing
agreement in order to pursue a subsequent bid. However, in the absence of a provision like § 251(d), a board
that agrees to do so may find itself in breach of the agreement leaving the corporation open to damages in
contact.
54. See generally Brian JM Quinn, Re-Evaluating the Emerging Standard of Review for Matching Rights
in Control Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011 (2011) (discussing matching rights in merger agreements).
55. In re 3Com S'holder Litig., Civil Action No. 5067-CC, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18,
2009) (characterizing matching rights as "standard [] terms" in merger agreements); In re Toys "R" Us, Inc.,
877 A.2d 975, 1017 (Del. Ch. 2005) (noting that matching rights are "common contractual feature[s]"); In re
Pennaco Energy, Inc. S'holder Litig., 787 A.2d 691, 707 (Del. Ch. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff challenges that the
combination of termination fees and matching rights were anything more than "modest deal protection
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ubiquity of these measures belies the court's dismissiveness of matching rights as
effective deal protections. If one supposes that matching rights were no more than
boilerplate, or mere surplusage, then one might expect to see variability with respect to
their use. However, there is very little variability. In fact, there is near uniformity in the
use of information rights and other forms of matching rights. Their usage suggests that
buyers value their presence in merger agreements. To the extent such protections become
common or standard terms, it is unlikely that sellers will ever be able to negotiate
incremental increases in value in exchange for the added protection they afford buyers.
In recent years, parties have also become increasingly creative in their use of
standstill agreements as deal protections. The standstill agreement strategy falls under the
broad category of "exclusivity measures" and its designers intended it to prevent selling
boards from considering or negotiating a superior offer with a potential rival acquirer.56
The parties typically negotiate standstill agreements to include a contractual prohibition
against attempting to pursue the target in anything other than a friendly transaction. The
purpose of this restriction is to ensure that the seller's board remains in control of the
negotiated transaction by cutting off the ability of the bidder to go around the board
straight to the shareholders via a tender offer.
The economic argument in favor of the standstill agreement was recently described
by Chancellor Strine in Ancestry.5 7 The Chancellor observed that a properly motivated
and informed board might believe that it is important-even necessary-to have auction
rules that require bidders to put up their best and final bid, rather than engage in a series
of "negotiauctions." 58 In doing so, the standstill agreement permits a board to establish
credible rules of the game and promote an orderly auction.59 Bidders who low-ball
targets may find themselves contractually prohibited from launching a subsequent hostile
bid and losing an opportunity to acquire the seller. Sellers who use standstills in this way
are engaging in precommitment strategies intended to maximize the value from a pre-
signing auction. Notice, of course, that this structure is process-oriented and not outcome-
oriented.
Standstills can become powerful defensive measures in post-signing when boards
deploy them to prevent an unsuccessful initial bidder from asking for a waiver and
preventing sellers from waiving any standstill provisions with respect to any potential
bidders. To the extent these "don't ask-don't waive" provisions require boards to keep
their eyes and ears closed to any second bids, such provisions may be preclusive.
measures").
56. Quinn, supra note 4, at 869 (describing the general category of exclusivity measures as deal
protections).
57. The Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 23-24, In re Ancestry.com,
C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012), available at http://www.wlrk.com/docs/
121712%20Ancestry%20ruling.pdf.
58. Id. A negotiauction is a hybrid strategy of bilateral negotiations and competitive, auction-like
arrangements. SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 25, at 126-27. Professor Subramanian argues that hybrid strategies
like negotiauctions lead to higher prices for sellers. Id.
59. In re Topps S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007). A properly deployed standstill
agreement is an apt example of precommitment in action. The buyer and the seller irrevocably commit to a
process that has the effect of drawing information out of the buyer about its private valuation of the seller, thus
increasing the value of the transaction to the seller.
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V. THE NEW DEAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE
In general, the Chancery Court has not been enthusiastic about Omnicare's more
controversial holding. In fact, with few exceptions the court has regularly sought to pare
back and limit the application of the ruling. The Chancery Court's restrained approach to
Omnicare is more of a type with Delaware's largely secular move away from substantive
review of the decision-making process of boards. For example, at one point the legal
community engaged in a vibrant debate about the proper limits of board action in the
context of the hostile tender offer. This debate focused on the question of the proper
contours of the Unocal standard.60 This vibrant debate is now largely over. 6 1 The court
has denuded Unocal's threat prong but left the proportionality prong, leaving only
shareholder coercion as a workable standard.
In the years immediately following Unocal, no one did more than Chancellor
William Allen to grapple with the meaning of the decision and apply its principles to the
messy facts that present themselves in the courtroom. In AC Acquisitions Corp. v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co.,62 Chancellor Allen first applied Unocal to a board's defensive
tactics in response to an unsolicited offer.63 The board of Anderson, Clayton developed
an economically coercive alternative offer for shareholders in response to an unwanted
offer from Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., Gruss Petroleum Corp. and Gruss Partners
(collectively "BS/G"). 64 While agreeing with the board that BS/G's offer represented a
mild threat, Chancellor Allen ruled that the board's preferred response, an economically
coercive alternative that would cause all rational shareholders to eschew the BS/G offer
was coercive and therefore not reasonable in response to the threat posed. 65 Rather than
provide shareholders with a choice in the face of an unsolicited offer, the board's
alternative was designed to effectively take away shareholder autonomy with respect to
the decision whether or not to accept the bidder's offer. 66 For Chancellor Allen,
eliminating shareholder autonomy went too far.67
60. Academics and practitioners have lined up on both sides of this debate. Those arguing for allocating
more authority to shareholders over the management of the corporation include Ronald J. Gilson, Lucian
Bebchuk, and Daniel Fischel, among many others. Those arguing for a more limited role for shareholders in the
management of the corporation include Martin Lipton and Stephen Bainbridge.
61. See generally Steven Davidoff, A Case Study: Air Products v. Airgas and the Value of Strategic
Judicial Decision-Making, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 502 (2012) (evaluating the status of strategic decision-
making in Delaware corporation law cases).
62. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
63. Id.atll2-15.
64. Id. at 105.
65. The court acknowledged that:
[t]he BS/G offer poses a "threat" of any kind (other than a threat to the incumbency of the Board)
only in a special sense and on the assumption that a majority of the Company's shareholders might
prefer an alternative to the BS/G offer. On this assumption, it is reasonable to create an option that
would permit shareholders to keep an equity interest in the firm, but, in my opinion, it is not
reasonable in relation to such a "threat" to structure such an option so as to preclude as a practical
matter shareholders from accepting the BS/G offer.
Id. at 113.
66. Id.
67. AC Acquisitions Corp., 519 A.2d at 115. Furthermore, the court stated:
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In AC Acquisitions, Chancellor Allen engaged in more than just a cursory review of
board process. In what would become a trademark of the Chancery Court's approach to
the application of Unocal, the court engaged in a substantive analysis of the threat
proposed by the unsolicited offer and made a determination about whether the board's
response was reasonable in relation to the threat.68 In these early years of implementation
by the Chancery Court, the intermediate standard exhibited a degree of plasticity that
would permit trial courts to engage in substantive review of director decisions and
provide for a real threat of sanction in the event of board over-reach. 69
In Capital City Associates v. Interco Inc. Chancellor Allen determined whether the
adoption of a board sponsored alternative transaction was reasonable in response to an
unwanted bidder's offer. 70 Chancellor Allen adopted a version of Professors Gilson and
Kraakman's formulation of substantive coercion and approach to the intermediate
standard when he expounded on the nature of cognizable threats to the corporation under
Unocal.7 1 Allen identified two threats to the corporation. The first set of threats is the
threat to voluntariness of shareholder choice. 72 Offers that are structurally coercive, like
front-end loaded tender offers, coerce stockholders to tender against their will and are
thus cognizable threats. 73 The second set of cognizable threats stems from inadequate,
but otherwise non-coercive offers. 74 The threat in such cases is not necessarily that a
shareholder will make an irrational decision to tender into a low-ball offer, but that in the
absence of any negotiating leverage, a target board might be unable to engage in active
negotiating to refuse an initial offer and extract a higher offer or have sufficient time to
generate a more valuable alternative for shareholders to choose. 75 In any event, where the
threat is the inadequacy of price, there are natural limits to the use of defensive measures
intended to deprive shareholders of the right to choose the offer for themselves. 76
As Chancellor Allen developed and applied the new intermediate standard, the
substantive nature of the threat determined the limits of a reasonable response. In the face
Plaintiffs contend to the contrary that the Company Transaction was deliberately structured so that
no rational shareholder can risk tendering into the BS/G offer. Plaintiffs say this for two related
reasons: (1) Stockholders tendering into the BS/G offer have no assurance that BS/G will take
down their stock at $56 a share since that offer is subject to conditions including a minimum
number of shares tendered and abandonment of the Company Transaction; and (2) Tendering
shareholders would thereby preclude themselves from participating in the "fat" front-end of the
Company Transaction and risk having the value of all their shares fall very dramatically. In such
circumstances, plaintiffs say, to characterize the Board's action as an attempt to preserve the ability
of shareholders to choose is a charade. They claim the Company Transaction is coercive in fact and
in the circumstances presented, improperly so in law.
Id. at 113.
68. Id
69. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: "Sacred
Space" in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEx. L. REv. 261, 283 (2001) (noting that in the years following Unocal,
the court rarely applied the standard in a manner adverse to defendant boards).
70. Capital City Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 789 (Del. Ch. 1988).
71. Id. at 796.
72. Id. at 797.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Interco, 551 A.2d at 798.
76. Id.
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of a structurally coercive offer that robs shareholders of their autonomy, courts should
grant boards significant leeway in determining appropriate defenses.7 7 On the other hand,
in the face of milder threats like substantive coercion, the court should be more measured
in permitting board discretion to resist offers. For example, although the court would
likely permit a shareholder rights plan in order to assist a target board to negotiate a
higher price for a seller where the threat identified by the board was an inadequate offer,
Chancellor Allen made it clear that relying on a rights plan to permanently foreclose
autonomous shareholders from an opportunity to choose an unsolicited offer would go
too far given the nature of the threat.7 8
Seeking that careful balance between shareholder choice on the one hand, and the
obligation of the boards to act in the best interests of shareholders and the corporation on
the other, is a hallmark of Chancellor Allen's approach to Unocal. On the one hand,
courts are appropriately hesitant to become too involved in reviewing the substance of
business decisions. On the other hand, where boards act to defend the corporation against
threats, the court is in a unique position to moderate the cognitive biases that are the
essential motivators of Unocal. Chancellor Allen recognized that for the intermediate
standard to function as it was intended, judges would be required to investigate and pass
judgment on the substance of board decisions with respect to defensive measures. Most
of the Chancery Court opinions in the years after Unocal followed some form of
Chancellor Allen's approach to balancing these interests. 79
The Delaware Supreme Court, however, did not follow Chancellor Allen's
approach. When in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. 80 the court was asked
to rule on the appropriateness of Time's response to Paramount's unsolicited offer, it took
the opportunity, in dicta, to reject the Chancellor's approach to the intermediate standard:
Plaintiffs' position represents a fundamental misconception of our standard of
review under Unocal principally because it would involve the court in
substituting its judgment as to what is a "better" deal for that of a corporation's
board of directors. To the extent that the Court of Chancery has recently done
so in certain of its opinions, we hereby reject such approach as not in keeping
with a proper Unocal analysis. 81
Rather than limiting the scope of cognizable threats as in Interco, the Delaware Supreme
Court adopted an approach to the intermediate standard that was highly deferential to a
board's decisions to identify a broader set of threats to the corporation, including
inadequacy of price, shareholder mistake, uncertainty with respect to the offer, and
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Among others, see Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 289 (Del. Ch. 1989)
(observing that "where there has been sufficient time for an alternative to developed and proposed to
shareholders the threat ... to shareholders ... seems almost without substance"); Grand Metro. Public Ltd. Co.
v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1060 (Del. Ch. 1988) (agreeing with and following Chancellor Allen's analysis
in Interco with respect to shareholder choice); Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1241-42
(Del. Ch. 1988) (identifying the development of a management-sponsored alternative as a reasonable response
to the threat of an inadequate price).
80. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
81. Id. at 1151.
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timing of the offer. 82 At the time, the Court defended deference to board decisions as
necessary to ensure the "flexibility" of the Unocal standard. 83 The Court made it clear in
adopting a deferential position with respect to board actions that the Unocal standard was
"not intended as an abstract standard; neither [was] it a structured and mechanistic
procedure of appraisal." 84 Although it may not have realized it at the time, in allocating
what it called a high degree of flexibility to boards with respect to their identification of
cognizable threats to the corporation, the court was ensuring a high degree of mechanistic
application. In the years since, identification of "threats" to the corporation devolved into
little more than asserting an inadequate or low-ball offer with support from investment
banker opinions. With Paramount, the court began a steady move away from the
substantive intermediate standard in favor a more conservative, less flexible, approach to
application of the standard.
Later, when the Delaware Supreme Court revisited the intermediate standard in
Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,85 the court demonstrated its new adherence to a
more procedurally-oriented understanding of Unocal.8 6 The Unitrin court reviewed a
decision by then-Vice Chancellor Chandler who found that when the Unitrin board
adopted a poison pill, advance notice bylaw provisions, and a share repurchase plan, the
board had violated its duties under Unocal.87 Although the board had properly identified
a mild threat in the form of a low-ball bid and potential antitrust challenges to completing
a potential transaction with American General, Vice Chancellor Chandler struck down
the share repurchase program as an unreasonable response in relation to the threat. Given
that the board had already put a pill and advance notice bylaw provisions in place, the
share repurchase plan was not necessary to defend against the mild threat represented by
an inadequate offer.8 8 In determining whether the defensive measures were reasonable in
relation to the threat, Vice Chancellor Chandler looked at the substance of the threat as
well as the substance of the response. 8 9 The Vice Chancellor reasoned that the repurchase
program was not necessary to accomplish the goal of protecting Unitrin from the mild
threat of an inadequate bid.90 Therefore, the plan was not reasonable in relation to the
82. Id. at 1153.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
86. See id at 1375-89 (applying the Unocal test to the facts of the case).
87. See generally In re Unitrin, Inc. S'holders Litig., Civ A. Nos. 13656, 13699, 1994 WL 698483 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 13, 1994), rev'd sub nom. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) (setting forth the
Court of Chancery's opinion).
88. Id.
89. Id.at*5-10.
90. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1377. Regarding the Chancery Court's decision in the case, the Delaware
Supreme Court wrote:
The Court of Chancery framed the ultimate question before it as follows:
This case comes down to one final question: Is placing the decision to sell the company in
the hands of stockholders who are also directors a disproportionate response to a low price
offer to buy all the shares of the company for cash?
The Court then answered that question:
I conclude that because the only threat to the corporation is the inadequacy of an opening bid
made directly to the board, and the board has already taken actions that will protect the
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threat. Vice Chancellor Chandler's approach to Unocal reflected Allen's: a conservative
approach that board defensive responses should be limited to the minimum required to
achieve the desired ends.
In Unitrin, the court adopted the view that "substantive coercion" is a legally
cognizable threat.9 1 However, in rejecting then-Vice Chancellor Chandler's opinion
below, the court denuded substantive coercion of much of the meaning Professors Gilson
and Kraakman gave it.92 That is, the court identified the potential threat that shareholders
might tender their shares in ignorance or based upon a mistaken belief (substantive
coercion), but did not require that a board respond to those threats by addressing them
directly through an information campaign, as Professors Gilson and Kraakman and the
Chancery Court recommended. 93 Going forward, the doctrine of substantive coercion
would permit boards to identify inadequate bids as threats to corporate policy without the
substantive limits on board action that Professors Gilson and Kraakman proposed.
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court refused to impose any sort of reasonable
restriction on board action when it ruled that the Chancery Court had incorrectly found
one of the Unitrin board's defenses disproportionate to the threat faced by the
corporation. The Chancery Court had ruled that a share repurchase program instituted as
stockholders from mistakenly falling for a low ball negotiating strategy, a repurchase
program that intentionally provides members of the board with a veto of any merger proposal
is not reasonably related to the threat posed by American General's negotiable all shares, all
cash offer.
In explaining its conclusion, the Court reasoned that:
I have no doubt that a hostile acquiror can make an offer high enough to entice at least some
of the directors that own stock to break ranks and sell their shares. Yet, these directors
undoubtedly place a value, probably a substantial one, on their management of Unitrin, and
will, at least subconsciously, reject an offer that does not compensate them for that value....
The prestige and perquisites that accompany managing Unitrin as a member of its Board of
directors, even for the non-officer directors that do not draw a salary, may cause these
stockholder directors to reject an excellent offer unless it includes this value in its "price
parameter."
Id.
91. Id. at 1384 ("[T]his Court held that the Time board of directors had reasonably determined that
inadequate value was not the only threat that Paramount's all cash for all shares offer presented, but was also
reasonably concerned that the Time stockholders might tender to Paramount in ignorance or based upon a
mistaken belief, i.e., yield to substantive coercion.").
92. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden
Value, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 521, 523 (Winter 2002) ("[lIt is closely related to the Orwellian notion of 'substantive
coercion,' a term which one of us now regrets having introduced more than a decade ago to describe how a
court might (by squinting) conclude that shareholders who wished to accept a tender offer were coerced into
doing so, merely because the target's board considered the offer price to be too low.").
93. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1384 ("Courts, commentators and litigators have attempted to catalogue the
threats posed by hostile tender offers. Commentators have categorized three types of threats: '(i) opportunity
loss . . . [where] a hostile offer might deprive target shareholders of the opportunity to select a superior
alternative offered by target management [or, we would add, offered by another bidder]; (ii) structural coercion,
... the risk that disparate treatment of non-tendering shareholders might distort shareholders' tender decisions;
and (iii) substantive coercion, ... the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because
they disbelieve management's representations of intrinsic value."' (quoting Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality
Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 267 (1989) (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted)).
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a belt-and-suspenders defense was disproportionate in relation to the threat because it was
"unnecessary" to achieve the aim of defending the corporation and shareholders against
the threat of an inadequate bid given the presence of a shareholder rights plan and an
advance notice provision that had already been implemented. 94
Abandoning any traditional principle of conservatism, the court overturned an
approach to proportionality that tied the nature of appropriate responses to the threats
they were meant to address. 95 Going forward, the courts would no longer engage in an
intensive investigation of facts to determine whether defensive measures were
disproportionate in relation to the threat. Instead, the court would work with heuristics to
determine proportionality. 96 Disproportionate defenses are those, according to the Unitrin
court, that are coercive, preclusive, or otherwise outside a range of reasonableness. 97
Coercive defenses are those that are "aimed at 'cramming down' on its shareholders a
management-sponsored alternative." 98 Defensive measures are preclusive of shareholder
action when they make shareholder action "mathematically impossible or realistically
unattainable." 99 Measures that are neither coercive nor preclusive of shareholder action
but lie outside a range of reasonableness may also be disproportionate responses to
threats. 100 The new proportionality announced in Unitrin is thus a very different
conception of proportionality, and one that favors procedural review over substantive
review.
Notwithstanding the Delaware Supreme Court's adoption of its substantive coercion
doctrine and its preference for a high degree of deference to board decisions to adopt
defenses against unsolicited tender offers, the Chancery Court continued to struggle with
application of the intermediate standard in exactly those situations. For example, in In re
Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholder Litigation, Vice Chancellor Strine questioned
whether it was even possible for a non-coercive tender offer, even an inadequate one, to
94. Id. at 1385.
95. In the process, the court ignored its own admonition to tie defensive responses to the identified
threats:
Pursuant to the Unocal proportionality test, the nature of the threat associated with a particular
hostile offer sets the parameters for the range of permissible defensive tactics. Accordingly, the
purpose of enhanced judicial scrutiny is to determine whether the Board acted reasonably in
"relation ... to the threat which a particular bid allegedly poses to stockholder interests."
Id. at 1384 (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989) (alteration in
original)).
96. Professors D. Gordon Smith and Robert B. Thompson later asserted that Unocal proportionality
review was a "dead-letter." Thompson & Smith, supra note 69, at 286.
97. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387-88.
98. Id. at 1387.
99. Id. at 1389.
100. Id. at 1388. The court later explained:
Even if a defense is not preclusive, the court must strike down the defense if the directors fail to
persuade the court that that defense was within the "range of reasonableness." That is, Unitrin left
room for a determination that a non-preclusive, non-coercive defensive measure was nonetheless
unreasonable in light of the threat faced by the corporation. As we shall soon see, this "range"
comes into play in this case, according to Yucaipa.
Yucaipa American Alliance Fund II, LP v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 337 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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be a threat to the corporation. 101 In doing so, Vice Chancellor Strine reiterated doubts
that Vice Chancellor Allen raised earlier in TW Services, where Allen identified a tender
offer as a question of shareholder property rights and not one that necessarily implicates
board rights. 102 Vice Chancellor Strine also questioned whether boards, when they block
unsolicited tender offers, have the right to reach out to impinge on shareholder autonomy
in the form of property rights.10 3
The importance of shareholder autonomy to the question of the limits of board
authority has been a regular theme in the Chancery Court since it first began struggling
with implementing the intermediate standard. 104 Shareholder autonomy will ultimately
become the reed upon which the shell of Unocal will rest. Central to the shareholder
autonomy framework is the respect that the law provides to uncoerced shareholder
decisions to purchase and sell shares. The law generally presumes shareholders are
perfectly capable of making decisions to buy and sell their shares. In fact, during periods
of severe market stress, the law has little to say about shareholder decisions to sell at
prices below the intrinsic value of the firm. Indeed, boards do not generally attempt to
prevent shareholders from selling their shares when markets underprice or otherwise
misprice the shares. In the words of Chancellor Strine, the law does not generally
"ascribe rube-like qualities to stockholders" when it comes to their investment
decisions. 10 5 The tender offer and decisions by shareholders whether to accept a non-
coercive tender offer is an obvious anomaly in the takeover jurisprudence. Here, the
courts are willing to permit boards to step in between a shareholder and an offer, limited
101. In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 747 A.2d 71, 78 (Del. Ch. 1999). Again, the court
explained:
Nor is it clear to me why a board's action to interpose itself between stockholders who are
ordinarily free to sell their shares, and purchasers who are ordinarily free to buy those shares-if
improper-works an injury on the corporation as an entity. In circumstances where directors act to
protect against inadequate acquisition offers, they are acting to protect stockholders from selling at
an inadequate price. If they act improperly and prevent stockholders from receiving a favorable
offer, it is difficult to conceive how the corporation qua corporation is harmed. It is not at all
difficult-in fact, it is quite obvious-how the stockholders qua stockholders are injured.
Id.
102. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., CIV. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *9 (Del.
Ch. March 2, 1989).
103. Justice Strine wrote:
In a capitalist nation like ours, I would think it inarguable that an owner of stock has the right to
sell her property, free and clear of unreasonable restrictions imposed by the directors of the
corporation she partly owns. Why should our law not recognize such an unquestionable right as
individual?
In re Gaylord Container Corp., 747 A.2d at 78-79.
104. See, e.g., In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 92 (Del. Ch. 2007); (struggling to apply the
intermediate standard in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction on a proposed merger; Mercier v.
Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc. 929 A.2d 786, 807-09 (Del. Ch. 2007) (addressing problems with the intermediate
standard); Chesapeake v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 328 (Del. Ch. 2000) (expressing concern with using the
substantive coercion doctrine).
105. Chesapeake, 771 A.2d at 328 ("Our law should also hesitate to ascribe rube-like qualities to
stockholders. If stockholders are presumed competent to buy stock in the first place, why are they not presumed
competent to decide when to sell in a tender offer after an adequate time for deliberation has been afforded
them?").
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only by Unocal's proportionality prong.
Unocal's proportionality prong is dominated by its heuristics. Although there are
three disjunctive components to the prong (coercion, preclusivity, and a "range of
reasonableness" analysis), there is little doubt that the coercion and preclusivity heuristics
have been the dominant tools that courts rely on. Courts have been reluctant to deploy
"range of reasonableness" analyses, perhaps because it requires judges to conduct a
substantive review of the efficacy of deal protections of the type Chandler undertook in
Unitrin and Allen in Interco before him.106 Consequently, coercion and preclusivity are
left bearing the burden of proportionality review.
That changed in 2010 when the Delaware Supreme Court decided Versata
Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica Inc. 107 In Versata, the court attempted to provide additional
clarity about Unocal's proportionality prong by restating its understanding of the
preclusivity heuristic. 10 8 It succeeded, however, only in stripping preclusivity of much of
its meaning. Justice Holland, who wrote the court's opinion in Unitrin clarified the
Court's understanding of preclusivity, which was earlier defined by the "mathematically
possible or realistically unattainable standards" in the following way:
A successful proxy contest that is mathematically impossible is, ipso facto,
realistically unattainable. Because the "mathematically impossible" formulation
in Unitrin is subsumed within the category of preclusivity described as
"realistically unattainable," there is, analytically speaking, only one test of
preclusivity: "realistically unattainable." 109
The court appeared to adopt the more liberal view of preclusivity as between the two
when it adopted the realistically unattainable standard; in fact, the court, as it had done
previously with the substantive coercion doctrine, used an exercise to clarify its position
to rob the announced standard of any meaning.
The question that the court was asked to resolve in Versata was whether an effective
staggered board, combined with a poison pill, is a "preclusive" defensive measure and
therefore unreasonable in response to the threat posed. 110 The plaintiffs offered
uncontroverted evidence that, during that period, no bidder had ever successfully
overcome the effective staggered board/poison pill defense to acquire control of a
target. 111 Given that evidence, it would be unrealistic for a potential acquirer to believe
ex ante that they would be able overcome this combination of defensive measures. That is
to say, the evidence before the court suggested strongly that the goal of overcoming an
effective staggered board/poison pill combination was not realistically attainable.
However, the Delaware Supreme Court differed with this conclusion. It reasoned
that "[t]he fact that a combination of defensive measures makes it more difficult for an
acquirer to obtain control of a board does not make such measures realistically
106. Elsewhere, I have urged the courts to revitalize the "range of reasonableness" analysis in their review
of deal protection measures. See Quinn, supra note 54, 1048-49 (urging courts to find the use of matching
rights outside the range of reasonableness).
107. Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica Inc., 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
108. Id. at 601.
109. Id.
110. Id.at603.
111. Id. at 601-02.
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unattainable, i.e., preclusive." 1 12 In other words, the mere fact that no buyer has ever
successfully overcome the combined effective staggered board/poison pill defense does
not mean it is impossible. Theoretically, it is possible that a determined second bidder
will pull off the two consecutive proxy contests required to overcome the defense. This
new understanding of the term "realistically unattainable" seems odd from a plain
English point of view. If, over the past three decades, no bidder had ever successfully
overcome the effective staggered board/poison pill defense, then a bidder's declaration
that it is determined to be the first to overcome the defense is not realistic. To be
realistically attainable, there should be some reasonably accessible evidence that
someone in the recent past has been able to achieve the goal proscribed.
Here, there is absolutely no evidence that the object is attainable. That the court
nevertheless concluded that overcoming the defense was realistically attainable suggests
a new definition for the term. In Versata, the court effectively defined realistically
attainable as "theoretically possible." To the extent the court rules that theoretical,
nonrealistic deal protection measures, which leave an opportunity for a topping bid, are
not preclusive, a broad brush of very strong deal protections then become possible.
OPENLANE's quick-consent strategy was not preclusive because it was theoretically
possible, though not realistic, because during the 24-hour period between signing and
delivery of the consents, a second bidder might have appeared and attempted to top the
incumbent bid. 113 Similarly, there is a strong argument that large termination fees are not
preclusivell 4 notwithstanding the fact that a large fee is payable before a determined
second bidder with a materially higher valuation can supplant an incumbent bidder.
Although large termination fees might realistically deter higher valuing second bidders
from coming forward, because large termination fees do not preclude shareholders from
accepting a higher bid, they may not be preclusive under the Delaware Supreme Court's
post-Versata interpretation of the term. Applying the Delaware Supreme Court's
understanding of the preclusivity standard suggests a shrinking space for the courts to
decide. 115
With this shrinking space, one is left to wonder what is left of the Unocal standard.
The Delaware Supreme Court's empty substantive coercion doctrine has left the threat
analysis wanting. With respect to Unocal's proportionality prong, preclusivity has been
defined nearly out of existence for the purposes of shareholders seeking to limit a board's
ability to adopt defensive measures that will have the effect of deterring subsequent
bidders. The "range of reasonableness" analysis remains mostly an afterthought to justify
deal protections rather than to exclude them. This leaves precious little space for judicial
maneuvering. Only shareholder coercion remains a viable area for judicial action.
112. Versata, 5 A.3d at 604.
113. In re OPENLANE, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, at *3 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 30, 2011).
114. I am not arguing that certain termination fees are not coercive. For example, a termination fee paid on
a 'naked no' vote might well be coercive if it is large enough.
115. I am not the first to observe this shrinking space. Professors Thompson and Smith observed that "the
Unocal standard reflect[s] a much more passive judicial role that seems to distrust shareholder decision-making
and to prefer that of directors." Thompson & Smith, supra note 69, at 262. Professors Thompson and Smith also
note in their study of litigation from 1995 to 2001 that the courts relied on the "range of reasonableness"
analysis only twice and observe that a judge's reliance on the coercion and preclusivity heuristics are
understandable. Id. at 294.
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In addition to developments in the Unocal doctrine, the court's naturally
conservative tendencies have given rise to what might be understood as a new
preliminary inquiry. Preliminary inquiries, like Unocal, are extremely important because
they are usually outcome-determinative. In the context of transaction-related litigation,
where there is no obvious prospect of a topping bid for the seller at the time the board
approves the merger agreement, courts are reluctant to second-guess board decisions to
enter into an agreement and protect it. I will not dwell on this point more than to suggest
that the competitive posture of a transaction affects the degree of scrutiny and the
aggressiveness of the court in reviewing board decisions to adopt deal protections. 116 If
the transaction in question is one in which there are no obvious second bidders, then the
courts will be highly deferential to selling boards' decisions to protect the transaction
from a second bid, provided shareholders have the opportunity to vote "no" in an
uncoerced shareholder vote. 117 Notwithstanding a highly imperfect process, courts
remain reasonably confident that shareholders are able to determine their own best
interests. Provided boards make full disclosure of the imperfections of the process and
shareholders are not coerced, courts are willing to defer to their conservative nature and
permit shareholders to decide whether to accept a premium offer. As a consequence,
where shareholders are presented with a single offer that management prefers, the only
constraint on board action under Unocal is coercion.1 18
116. For its part, the Omnicare majority also noted that its review of deal protection measures will vary
depending on the competitive posture of the transaction before it when it stated that when deal protection
measures are taken "against an existing bidder ... the latitude a board will have in either maintaining or using
the defensive devices it has adopted to protect the merger it approved will vary according to the degree of
benefit or detriment to the stockholders' interests that is presented by the value or terms of the subsequent
competing transaction." Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 933 (Del. 2003).
117. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S'holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 450-51 (Del. Ch. 2012) ("I share the
plaintiffs' frustration that the traditional tools of equity may not provide the kind of fine instrument that enables
optimal protection of stockholders in this context. The kind of troubling behavior exemplified here can result in
substantial wealth shifts from stockholders to insiders that are hard for the litigation system to police if
stockholders continue to display a reluctance to ever turn down a premium-generating deal when that is
presented. The negotiation process and deal dance present ample opportunities for insiders to forge deals that,
while 'good' for stockholders, are not 'as good' as they could have been, and then to put the stockholders to a
Hobson's choice. Think about some of the early management buyouts of the cappuccino market of 2006 and
2007 in that regard, where the early actions of poorly policed, conflicted CEOs in baking up deals with their
favorite private equity sponsors before any market check (or often even board knowledge) likely dampened the
competition among private equity firms that could have generated the highest price if proper conduct occurred
and the right process had been used. The resulting deals might have been good for investors, but the suspicion
that they were not on the 'best' terms available lingers for rational reasons."); see also Transcript of Telephonic
Oral Argument and the Court's Ruling at 25, In re Complete Genomics S'holder Litig., No. 7888-VCL (Del.
Ch. Nov. 27, 2012) available at http://www.wlrk.com/docs/In_reComplete
GenomicsSholderLitigation_CANo_7888-VCL_(DelChNov272012)(00232324).PDF (stating that,
because there was no evidence to suggest the board was even considering a second bid or that a potential bidder
had requested and was denied a waiver of the standstill provisions, the challenged deal protection had not run
afoul of the board's fiduciary obligations).
118. Chancellor Strine described his thinking with respect to permitting shareholders to accept uncoerced
shareholders in the face of imperfect process in the following way:
And people are going to, in an uncoerced way, get to decide for themselves to decide [sic] whether
to take the $8.20 or not. Because there's no coercion, you know, this Court should be hesitant-and
because this could possibly be a valuable price. It appears like it is a fairly high market multiple.
Whether the company has, frankly, told its story accurately enough so that it's getting full
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On the other hand, where there is competition present for a seller, courts will be less
deferential and are more likely to strike down or at least be critical of board attempts to
protect the incumbent transaction from second bidders. There, however, the board is
likely to fall short because of its obligations under Revlon to be even handed and not
unreasonably favor one bidder over any other. 119
The motivation for the court's reticence to intercede in the absence of the prospect
of a competitive bid is understandable, but it may also be self-defeating. Courts are
extremely reluctant to get into the business of passing on the substance of transactions.
As the court in OPENLANE observed, "it is not at all clear that the Court should
automatically enjoin the merger when no superior offer has emerged." 120 An order to
blue-line a merger agreement that is not subject to a competing offer may strike judges as
too much of an intrusion into the business judgments of boards. The great irony of this
approach, however, is that the court's own reluctance tends to reward the most preclusive
deal protection measures-those that are most effective at deterring second bids-and
create an incentive for buyers to increase the levels of effective contractual deal
protections as much as possible without fear of judicial interference. The court then finds
itself in an awkward position of its own making where deals are highly protected-but
still compliant with a narrow reading of Omnicare-and challenges appear before the
court where there is no second bidder. Courts then shrug and rely on disclosure while
they pass on a more substantive review of the deal protection measures.
The fact that courts are deferential to non-competitive transactions is not to say that
courts have completely given up efforts to place limits on boards with respect to deal
protections. Rather, the new deal protection jurisprudence appears to have limited the
number and type of deal protections that might run afoul of Unocal. In such situations,
courts might find that only coercive deal protections violate Unocal's proportionality
prong. In recent cases where the courts have ruled that deal protection measures exceed a
board's authority, the court has protected the statutory rights of shareholders and the
statutory obligations of boards in the context of a shareholder vote. Courts have deemed
coercive-and therefore beyond a board's authority to grant--deal protection measures
that impinge on the free exercise of statutory rights.
recognition, I don't know; but it appears-it may be-and this is not a bad thing, but it may be
taking advantage of selling at the top of the market. . ..
But the risk I take out of the hands of the people whose money's at stake the ability to make an
uncoerced decision for themselves to accept this price. . . . The confidence I have of taking it
actually out of the hands of the stockholders and making the investment choice for them I don't
have [sic].
Transcript of Oral Argument at 23-24, Forgo v. Health Grades, Inc., Civil Action No. 5716-VCS (Del. Ch.
Sept. 3, 2010), available at http://www.kirkland.com/files/MAUpdate/Health%20Grades.pdf. Chancellor
Strine believes it is important to defer to uncoerced shareholders who have the ability to vote "no." It also
appears obvious that he defers reluctantly, knowing that boards may be able to cover a variety of sins by
presenting shareholders with a premium offer.
119. Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
120. In re OPENLANE, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, at *10 n.53 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 30, 2011). See, e.g., Transcript of Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court's Ruling, supra note 117,
at 23 (concluding that because there was no evidence to suggest the Board was even considering a second bid or
that a potential bidder had requested and was denied a waiver of the standstill provisions, the don't ask-don't
waive provision had not run afoul of the board's fiduciary obligations).
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In addition to coercive deal protection measures that might cause shareholders to
accept an offer that they might not otherwise accept, there are two types of deal
protections that run afoul of statutory authority and have caused the courts to pause in
recent years. First, deal protection measures that purport to limit the ability of the board
to communicate with its own stockholders likely go too far. 121 Of course, covenants with
respect to board recommendations as part of the merger agreement are nothing new.
However, given the limited room to maneuver within Unocal, courts are giving more
attention to these covenants. Purported restrictions on the ability of boards to change or
reconsider their recommendation with respect to the advisability of the merger agreement
now get negative attention.122
For example, in Compellent, the merger agreement purported to restrict the ability of
the seller's board to change its positive recommendation by delaying the timing of such a
change. 123 Vice Chancellor Laster asked rhetorically:
if stockholders are entitled to a current, candid, and accurate board
recommendation, can a merger agreement contractually prevent the board from
updating its recommendation for "at least four business days" and potentially
longer given procedural hurdles and a requirement that "any change in the form
or amount of the consideration payable in connection with a Superior Offer,
and any other material change to any of the terms of a Superior Offer, will be
deemed to be a new Superior Offer (or other Acquisition Proposal), requiring a
new Recommendation Change Notice and a new advance notice period? 124
The court, however, noted that in agreeing to tie their own hands by delaying the time at
which the board would change its recommendation to shareholders, the board may be
compromising its statutory obligation to provide the shareholders with a current
recommendation, therefore implicating the integrity of the statutorily required
shareholder vote. 125 Later, in his transcript ruling in Genomics, Vice Chancellor Laster
was more explicit about the obligations of a board with respect to its recommendation in
the context of a statutory merger:
A board has an ongoing fiduciary obligation to review and update its
recommendation. That's clear from the original Van Gorkom decision. It was
the explicit holding of Vice Chancellor Noble in the Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly
Corp. decision-I'm going to quote from that-"Revisiting the commitment to
recommend the Merger was not merely something that the Merger Agreement
allowed the Board to do; it was the duty of the Board to review the transaction
to confirm that a favorable recommendation would continue to be consistent
with its fiduciary duties." Maintaining a current and candid merger
121. Transcript of Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court's Ruling, supra note 117, at 18; Transcript of
Settlement Hearing at 46, In re Rehabcare Grp, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 28,
2011).
122. In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 6084-VCL, 2011 WL 6382523, at *13 (Del.
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recommendation is part of the director's duty of disclosure. 126
While no court has yet sought to nullify purported constraints on boards' ability to
change their recommendations, there is no reason to suspect that once the courts focus on
the requirement that boards owe shareholders their timely and unfettered view on the
prospect of a merger that recommendation delays built into matching rights and other
deal protection devices should survive for long. Where a recommendation delay prevents
directors from updating their recommendation to shareholders with respect to the
transaction at issue, a court could well find that such a deal protection is coercive and
thus exceeds a board's ability to contract.
A second area where the courts have begun to focus their attention is the use of
restrictive standstill agreements as deal protection measures. Over the past year or so,
parties have been litigating so called "don't ask-don't waive" provisions in standstill
agreements.12 7 Such provisions attempt to contractually prevent potential second bidders
from asking the seller's board to waive standstills, and, in that way, provide increased
transactional certainty for initial bidders. To the extent courts have been asked to rule on
don't ask-don't waive provisions in recent months, they have mostly reacted negatively
to such provisions. For example, in Celera, Vice Chancellor Parsons observed that:
Plaintiffs have at least a colorable argument that these constraints collectively
operate to ensure an informational vacuum. Moreover, the increased risk that
the Board would outright lack adequate information arguably emasculates
whatever protections the No Solicitation Provision's fiduciary out otherwise
could have provided. Once resigned to a measure of willful blindness, the
Board would lack the information to determine whether continued compliance
with the Merger Agreement would violate its fiduciary duty to consider
superior offers. Contracting into such a state conceivably could constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty.128
The challenge of the don't ask-don't waive provisions is that when they work as
conceived, no second bid will appear. Second bidders will not ask for a waiver of a
standstill, and a board will not have a second bid to consider. Vice Chancellor Parsons
explained the fiduciary challenge thusly:
Plaintiffs argue that this deal protection measure was especially onerous in
Celera's case because the most likely competing bidders were the companies
already bound by the Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive Standstills. That is, Celera could
not reach out to the companies it already knew were interested, and those
companies could not reach out to Celera to take the necessary first step-
requesting a waiver of the standstill restrictions-to make a competing offer...
. Here, the Don't-Ask-Don't-Waive Standstills block at least a handful of once-
126. Transcript of Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court's Ruling, supra note 117, at 16.
127. Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 46, In re RehabCare Grp., Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 6197-
VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011) (expressing doubt that don't-ask-don't-waive standstills are "ever going to hold
up if it's actually litigated, particularly after Topps"). See generally Transcript of Telephonic Oral Argument
and the Court's Ruling, supra note 117 (litigating the don't ask-don't waive provision); In re Celera Corp.
S'holder Litig., Civil Action No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 1020471 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012) (litigating the don't
ask-don't waive provisions).
128. Celera, 2012 WL 1020471, at *21.
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interested parties from informing the Board of their willingness to bid
(including indirectly by asking a third party, such as an investment bank, to do
so on their behalf), and the No Solicitation Provision blocks the Board from
inquiring further into those parties' interest.129
Combine this with the typical deference courts provide sellers' boards in the absence of
competition, and the don't ask-don't waive provisions are potentially very powerful
transaction defenses if not carefully deployed. 13 0 To the extent boards use don't ask-
don't waive provisions to enforce a form of "willful blindness," such provisions can also
be abused. 131 Unfaithful or inattentive boards can use don't ask-don't waive provisions to
prevent bidders from making subsequent, perhaps superior, offers. This potential for
abuse requires courts to pause before passing on the appropriateness of such provisions.
Otherwise, shareholders may find themselves deprived of knowledge of potential second
bids and thus coerced to accept a suboptimal offer.
VI. OMNICARE'S FuTuRE AND DEAL PROTECTIONS
Notwithstanding the arguments that Omnicare would not survive, ten years later,
Omnicare has secured its place. Its contributions are mixed. The court's decision to apply
the intermediate standard of review to all deal protection measures was an important and
enduring contribution. Even the more controversial holding of the opinion-requiring an
effective fiduciary out-has survived the past decade, though somewhat worse for wear.
The policy that places outside limits on the ability of sellers' boards to lock-up a
transaction is good policy, and one should not run away from that.
The wear on Omnicare's legacy has come not necessarily from a direct attack on
Omnicare itself, but from the court's narrower application of the Unocal standard over
the past decade. Courts remain hesitant to rely on a range of reasonableness analysis,
perhaps for fear a reasonableness standard will require them to pass on the substance of
transactions and rely on their own business judgment. Courts have rarely relished putting
themselves in this position. Rather, the courts have relied on heuristics, like coercion and
preclusivity, to minimize wandering into unfamiliar territory. At the same time, courts
have narrowed the definition of one of these heuristics-preclusivity-to the point where
the term has lost most of its meaning. The only effective limit on the reasonableness of
defensive measures is through coercion. Only deal protection measures that are coercive
to shareholders are likely to run afoul of Unocal's narrow, modem application.
Consider again the quick consent strategy deployed in OPENLANE. A selling board
seeking to close its eyes to potential future offers could deliver consents sufficient to
approve the transaction within 24 hours, safe in the knowledge that a subsequent bidder is
not precluded from bidding during that short, interim period. Of course, a topping bid is
not likely, nor even realistic, during such a short window. In the private company context,
129. Id.
130. In re Topps S'holders' Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 953 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting that the board refused to
waive a standstill provision in order to favor one bidder over another).
131. "[D]irectors cannot willfully blind themselves to opportunities that are presented to them." Cirrus
Holding Co. Ltd. v. Cirrus Indus., 794 A.2d 1191, 1207 (Del. Ch. 2001); See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus
Amax Minerals Co., CIV.A. Nos. 17398, 17383, 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999)
(holding that foreclosing the opportunity to negotiate is the legal equivalent of willful blindness).
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there is perhaps no public window, as a deal would not be announced to the market until
well after the consents had been secured. Nevertheless, this strategy passes under
Unocal's narrower preclusivity standard. However, a board that agrees to a quick consent
strategy may run afoul of Unocal if it is doing so to disable itself from the prospect of
exercising its own fiduciary obligations during the post-signing/pre-closing period.1 32
Indeed, any fair reading of Omnicare's charge to include an effective fiduciary out
should conclude that the quick consent strategy, although compliant with the
requirements of the statute, runs afoul of directors' fiduciary obligations. Leaving the
strategy's coercive aspects aside, quick consent clearly precludes second bids even
though it complies technically with the requirements of Section 228 of the DGCL. It
would hardly be novel for a Delaware court to remind litigants that "inequitable action
does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible."1 3 3 Deal protections,
such as the quick consent strategy, should be, in the words of Chancellor Strine, "twice-
tested"-once by the law and again by equity." 134
To date, however, the courts have mostly been extremely reluctant, as was the court
in OPENLANE when it observed that enjoining a merger when no subsequent offer has
appeared "is a perilous endeavor because there is always the possibility that the existing
deal will vanish, denying stockholders the opportunity to accept any transaction."1 35 Of
course it is precisely this fear that makes otherwise preclusive deal protections lose their
power. If courts refuse to enjoin or proscribe deal protections that have the effect of
keeping second bids at bay, then buyers will have an incentive to increase the use of
highly protective deal protections that only just comply with the technical requirements
of Omnicare, but in fact do not provide shareholders with a realistic opportunity to accept
a second bid.136 It is worth remembering that Omnicare's charge is that every merger
include not just a fiduciary out, but an effective fiduciary out. To the extent fiduciary outs
devolve into no more than formalistic genuflections, they may run afoul of a plain
reading of Omnicare. Only by revisiting preclusivity and considering the "realistically
attainable" standard can courts create the room for maneuver required to provide any
credible resistance to incentives that result in incremental increases in deal protections
over time.
132. In Omnicare, the majority noted that Genesis bargained for measures to "completely protect[] its
transaction" precisely because of an anticipated eleventh-hour bid from Omnicare. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS
Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2002). Given the board's knowledge of the likelihood of this
eventuality, by failing to guarantee itself a fiduciary out, the board "disabled itself from exercising its own
fiduciary obligations at a time the board's own judgment is most important, i.e. receipt of a subsequent superior
offer." Id
133. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). See also Kurz v. Holbrook, 989
A.2d 140, 180-81 (Del. Ch. 2010) (observing that even though voting arrangements are permissible under §
218, the statute does not limit the court's ability to redress inequitable practices associated with voting
arrangements).
134. Sample v. Morgan, 914 A.2d 647, 672 (Del. Ch. 2007).
135. In re OPENLANE, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, at *16 n.54 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 30, 2011).
136. See generally John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89
CAL. L. REv. 1301 (2001) (arguing that defenses increase agency costs between shareholders and managers);
See also Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2013).
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